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RECENT DECISIONS
out legal or social justifiable cause to the injury of the plaintiff.8
From this malice may be inferred. As to what constitutes justifi-
able cause must be left to the jury in each case.9 The right to con-
tract enjoyment is now held by the courts to be a property and a legal
right; and any unjustified interference with it is an actionable legal
wrong.1 0 It is only natural for it to follow that broker's contracts
should be as zealously protected by the courts against interference
as other contracts. Surely in the instant case there was such a
"malicious interference" as to bring it within the interpretation of
that term in previous cases and was such as to justify the holding
of the court.
E. H. S.
CORPORATIONS-REFUSAL OF DIRECTORS TO DECLARE Divi-
DEND.-On April 8, 1909, plaintiff's foster mother died. At the
time of her death she was the owner of 20 shares of the capital stock
of the David Maydole Hammer Company. She left a will in which
she bequeathed to plaintiff during her lifetime the income and divi-
dends thereof, and after her decease the stock was given absolutely
to the three individual defendants. These three then were and still
are the owners of one-half of the stock of the corporation, the re-
maining twenty shares being owned since 1926 by a daughter of one
of them. The three individual defendants are and since 1908 have
been the controlling directors of the corporation, and they are the
ones who will eventually own the twenty shares of which plaintiff has
the dividends. The plaintiff charges that these defendants, being so
in control and with intent to build up a large surplus which under
the circumstances would profit them but would not benefit plaintiff,
have withheld making dividends in such sums as the business would
warrant, and have permitted large sums, which should have been
paid out as dividends, to accumulate as surplus. Plaintiff seeks an
accounting. Held, denied. Ochs v. David Maydole Hammer Co.,
138 Misc. Rep. 665, 246 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1930).
The directors of a corporation possess the right to declare divi-
dends, and it is for the directors, and not the stockholders to deter-
mine whether or not a dividend shall be declared.1 When therefore,
the directors have exercised this discretion and refused to declare a
'Campbell v. Gates, supra note 5; Lamb v. Cheney & Son, supra note
4 at p. 422; Posner v. Jackson, supra note 5; Gonzales v. Kentucky Derby
Co., supra note 6; Burdick, Law of Torts, sutpra note 1, Sec, 23 at p. 25, Sec.
415 at pp. 472-3.
' Cooley, Torts, supra note 6, p. 592.
" 
2 Supra note 8.
'Schell v. Alston Mfg. Co., 149 Fed. 439 (N. D., Ill., 1906); Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919); Hastings v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N. Y. Supp. 815 (1st Dept.,
1919).
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dividend, there will be no interference by the courts with their de-
cision, unless they are guilty of a wilful abuse of their discretionary
powers, or of bad faith or of a neglect of duty.2 And so deferring
declaration of dividends in an effort to improve the condition of the
company is permissible.3 Of course where the accumulation of
surplus is greatly in excess of capital and the directors' only motive
in increasing the surplus is for the purpose of expansion with no
thought of the rights of stockholders it may be deemed an abuse of
discretion not to declare a dividend.4 It is said that among the re-
serves which it may be prudent to establish before a surplus avail-
able for dividends is found are reserves for depreciation, repairs,
bad accounts, unknown taxes and fluctuations in business conditions. 5
The facts in the instant case do not warrant the interference of the
Court, if the rules laid down in the cases considered are to be fol-
lowed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the powers of the direc-
tors have been illegally or unconscientiously executed or that their
acts were fraudulent and destructive of the rights of stockholders.
H. L. B.
EQUITY--CANcELLATIoN-CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.-The de-
fendant defaulted in its contract to install fixtures in plaintiff's store
after it had partially performed. Plaintiff had given a series of
twenty-eight notes to defendant's attorney to be held in escrow until
completion of the contract, and in addition had given defendant a
conditional sales contract and a chattel mortgage. After repeated
efforts to get defendant to complete its contract plaintiff was finally
compelled to 'have the balance of the work performed by a third
party. The defendant somehow secured the notes from his attorney
and subsequently negotiated one of the notes. Plaintiff brought suit
in equity seeking cancellation of the notes, the chattel mortgage, and
the conditional sales contract. Defendant counterclaims for the bal-
'New York etc. R. R. v. Nickols, 119 U. S. 296, 7 Sup. Ct. 209 (1886) ;
Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 (1883); Burden v. Burden,
159 N. Y. 287, 54 N. E. 17 (1899), wherein the Court held that so long as
the directors are acting honestly, and within their discretionary powers in
accumulating a surplus in an iron manufacturing corporation, a stockholder
must abide by their decision and it is only when one can show that the di-
rectors are guilty of fraud and bad faith in accumulating a large surplus to
the injury of the stockholders that a court of equity would interfere.
' Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., ibid.
'Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 1; Reynolds v. Diamond Mills
Paper Co.. 69 N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Att. 941 (1905), wherein it appeared that
the surplus was employed exclusively in expansion of business and in increas-
ing salaries. The Court there held that the directors must bear in mind
the stockholders of the corporation and not accumulate a huge surplus which
might in the end go to future creditors of the corporation.
rBallantine, Private Corporations (1927) p. 507.
